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In his presentation on “Equality in Sheep’s Clothing,” Professor Brett Scharffs critically 
analyzed several instances that, in his opinion, exemplify a trend in recent times to afford 
preference to equality norms over freedom of religion. His analysis was mainly focused on the 
following: a case where, in the United States, an educational institution forfeited tax-
exemption privileges because it declined, on religious grounds, to admit black students;1 a 
case where an institution caring for people with developmental disabilities in Ontario, 
Canada, dedicated to Evangelical Christianity was condemned by a secular court for 
dismissing an employee who had engaged in a same-sex relationship;2 two judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) which, in the one instance, upheld the dismissal of 
an employee of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints because the employee 
committed marital infidelity,3 while, in the other instance, deciding on the very same day that 
the dismissal of an employee of the Roman Catholic Church for marital infidelity constituted 
a violation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms;4 and finally, the closing of a Catholic organization, by church authorities, that 
provided adoption services in Washington D.C. because legislation compelled them to 
facilitate adoptions by same-sex couples.5 
I shall confine my substantive comments, in the second part of this essay, to the two 
judgments of the ECHR. Those comments will be preceded, in the first part of the essay, by 
certain conceptual clarifications and explanatory notes on the special comparative relevance 
to our inquiry of South African law. Following our comments on the judgments of the ECHR, 
with reference also to German jurisprudence featured in those judgments, I shall, in the third 
part, focus on certain South African statutory provisions and case law concerning church-
state relations. I shall conclude my discussion, in the fourth part, with some observations. 
I. Religious Freedom, Autonomy and Sphere Sovereignty 
It seems to me that the crux of the problem under consideration is not exactly a matter of 
“the ascendancy of equality over freedom,” but rather interference by the repositories of 
political power in the internal affairs of religious institutions. That, in any event, is how the 
matter is depicted and regulated in South African law. 
Individual and Group Rights 
Freedom of religion, belief and opinion is, by its very nature, an individual right that can 
be exercised by “everyone,” either individually or in community with other (individual) 
                                                                                                                               
 1. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 2. Ontario Human Rights Comm’n v. Christian Horizons, [2010] 319 D.L.R. 4th 477 (Can.). 
 3. Obst v. Allemagne, App. No. 425/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010),  available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=obst%20
%7C%20425/03&sessionid=90483822&skin=hudoc-en. 
 4. Schüth v. Allemagne, App. No. 1620/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=1620/03
&sessionid=79414695&skin=hudoc-pr-en. 
 5. See, e.g., Gay Adoption to Proceed: UK Catholic Agency Loses Fight over Same-Sex Parents, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 22, 2010, 8:13 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/22/catholic-
adoption-agency-_n_689711.html. 
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members of a religious community. Freedom of religion can also take on the form of a 
collective group right; that is to say, a right that vests in an individual in the capacity of 
belonging to a particular category of persons, such as the rights of a child (the repository of 
such a right is an individual, but one that falls within the category of persons under the age of 
18 years).6 The right to self-determination of a religious community is a typical example of a 
collective group right within the range of religious freedom.7 
These freedoms must be clearly distinguished from the competence of a group entity, such 
as a church institution, to regulate and administer its internal affairs without interference by 
outside forces, including the agencies of state authority. The entitlement of private 
educational institutions or religious organizations to determine who to admit within their 
ranks, who to employ for the exercise of their calling, or what conditions to apply for the 
rendering of their services, vests in the institution or organization as such. It is, by its very 
nature, an institutional group right.8 The problem posed by Professor Scharffs is primarily 
one within the cadre of state interference in the internal affairs of non-state institutions, such 
as a church or other religiously-committed organization. It thus violates the internal sphere 
sovereignty of the group entities concerned. In this context, further conceptual clarity is called 
for. 
Sphere Sovereignty and Autonomy  
A distinction should be made between the exercise of power by an organization in virtue of 
a concession granted to it by another organization on the one hand, and the exercise of 
internal authority by an organization as of right on the other. Contemporary Calvinism refers 
to the first instance of domestic authority as a matter of autonomy, and the second as a 
matter of internal sphere sovereignty.9 Autonomy in this sense is confined to instances where 
the organization granting the power of domestic governance, and the recipient of such a 
grant, function within the enclave of a single social structure. The institution entrusted with 
autonomous power invariably forms part of an overarching organization that grants the 
power and is essentially structured as a subordinate part of that overarching organization. 
Autonomous powers may thus be afforded by a central governmental institution to regional 
and local political authorities within the domain of a single body politic. Autonomous powers 
may similarly be entrusted by the central power base of a church institution to subordinate 
local congregations.  
                                                                                                                               
 6. See JOHAN D. VAN DER VYVER, LEUVEN LECTURES ON RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS, RELIGIOUS 
COMMUNITIES AND RIGHTS 72 (2004) (defining the concept of collective group rights). 
 7. Id. at 77. 
 8. Id. (defining the concept of institutional group rights). 
 9. Id. at 43-45; see also Johan D. van der Vyver, Sphere Sovereignty of Religious Institutions: A 
Contemporary Calvinistic Theory of Church-State Relations, in CHURCH AUTONOMY: A 
CONTEMPORARY SURVEY 645, 656 (Gerhard Robbers ed., 2001); Johan D. van der Vyver, The 
Jurisprudential Legacy of Abraham Kuyper and Leo XIII, 5 J. MKTS. & MORALITY 211, 220-21 (2002) 
[hereinafter van der Vyver, Jurisprudential Legacy]; Johan D. van der Vyver, Culture and Equality: 
An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism by Brian Barry, 17 CONN. J. INT’L L. 323, 329-30 (2002) 
(book review). 
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Sphere sovereignty, on the other hand, implies the relationship between two or more 
structurally distinct social entities, such as church and state.10 Here, the internal sphere of 
competencies of each of the respective institutions is not dependent on a concession of the 
other, but belongs to each one in its own right and is founded on its existence and functioning 
as an independent component of human society. It is fair to conclude that the concerns 
expressed by Professor Scharffs, evaluated on the basis of this vital distinction, amounts to 
interpreting power structures which ought to be treated as instances of sphere sovereignty as 
though they were matters of autonomy. 
The South African Context 
The state of affairs relating to the sovereignty of religious institutions as regulated by the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, offers a commendable 
comparison with the problem highlighted by our introductory speaker. In the South African 
constitutional dispensation, equality is a preferred right. 
Comparative analysis should be sensitive to distinct foundational predilections that 
permeate the human rights regime of the different jurisdictions being surveyed. Every system 
of human rights protection is founded on, or affords special prominence to, a particular basic 
norm — a Grundnorm — of the entire rights regime: in the United States, the First 
Amendment freedoms with special prominence being afforded to freedom of speech; in 
Germany, human dignity; in Canada, perhaps, the principle of equal protection.11 
Equal protection and the proscription of discrimination is without a doubt the Grundnorm 
of the South African constitutional dispensation. Given the history of racial discrimination in 
that country, this stands to reason. The Constitution defines the “new South Africa” as “an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.”12 In a recent 
judgment of the Constitutional Court, Justice Froneman stated, with a view to this provision: 
“Equality, together with dignity and freedom, lie at the heart of the Constitution.”13 The 
Constitution accordingly protects the equality of everyone before the law and “the right to 
equal protection and benefit of the law,”14 subject, though, to remedial action “to protect or 
advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination” of the 
past.15 It prohibits unfair discrimination, directly or indirectly, by the state and by other 
persons based on “race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth,” or 
                                                                                                                               
 10. VAN DER VYVER, supra note 6, at 32-33, 41-43; van der Vyver, Jurisprudential Legacy, supra note 9, 
at 217-18. 
 11. Johan D. van der Vyver, Constitutional Protection of Children and Young Persons, in THE LAW OF 
CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS, 265, 282 (J.A. Robinson ed., 1997); Johan D. van der Vyver, 
Limitations of Freedom of Religion or Belief: International Law Perspectives, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
499, 508 (2005). 
 12. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 39(1)(a); and see also §§ 1(a), 7(1), 36(1). 
 13. Bengwenyana Minerals Ltd.  v. Genorah Res. Ltd. 2011 (3) BCLR 229 (CC) at 3 (S. Afr.). 
 14. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 9 (1). 
 15. Id. § 9 (2). 
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on other similar grounds.16 The constitutional right to equality is therefore “foundational to 
the open and democratic society envisaged by the Constitution.”17 It is “a core and 
fundamental value; a standard that must inform all law and against which all law must be 
tested for constitutional consonance.”18 In South Africa, equality does not impose itself “in 
sheep’s clothing”; it is a core value within the structures of all legal regulations. 
The special significance of the basic norm emerges when different constitutionally 
protected rights and freedoms come into conflict with one another. One should, in such cases, 
always try to reconcile the conflicting rights and freedoms, but where that becomes too 
challenging, the provision that is most supportive of the basic norm will prevail. In our 
discussions today, the question is exactly how to construe a fair balance between the dictates 
of sphere sovereignty and equality.  
The constitutional proscription of unfair discrimination in South Africa is, for purposes of 
the present survey, quite unique in two special respects: (a) sexual orientation is included as 
one of the grounds that would render differentiations for legal purposes a matter of unfair 
discrimination (unless it can be proven that the differentiation “is reasonable and justifiable 
in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom”19); and (b) 
the Constitution also makes provision for the proscription of discrimination by persons and 
institutions other than the state. To this latter end, the Promotion of Equality and Prevention 
of Unfair Discrimination Act was enacted in 2000.20 Since the Act “binds the State and all 
persons”21 and proclaims that “[n]either the State nor any person may unfairly discriminate 
against any person,” one might expect that discrimination by religious organizations based on 
gender or sexual orientation has been outlawed for all ends and purposes in South Africa. 
And let it not pass unnoticed that persons under an obligation to uphold the provisions of the 
Bill of Rights, including the dictates of equality and non-discrimination, include “a natural or 
a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of 
the right and the nature of the duty imposed by the right.”22  
Rest assured, though, that South African courts have thus far succeeded in finding a way 
within the labyrinth of constitutional constraints to uphold the sphere sovereignty of religious 
institutions. This will appear more fully in the third section of this essay.  
                                                                                                                               
 16. Id. § 9 (3,4); See also Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 § 
1(xxii) (“prohibited grounds”) ¶ (a) (S. Afr.). 
 17. Strydom v. Nederduitse Gereformeerde Gemeente, Moreletta Park 2009 (4) SA 510 (Equality Court, 
TPA) at 516 ¶ 14 (S. Afr.); see also Prince v. President, Cape Law Society, and Others 2002 (2) SA 
794 (CC) at 816 ¶ 49 (S. Afr.); Prince v. President, Cape Law Society and Others 2002 (3) BCLR 231 
(CC) at 54-55 ¶ 49 (S. Afr.). 
 18. Minister of Finance and Another v. Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) at 132-133 ¶ 22 (S. Afr.); see 
also Minister of Education and Another v. Syfrets Trust Ltd NO and Another 2006 (4) SA 205 (CPD) 
at 221 ¶ 31 (S. Afr.); Strydom, 2009 (4) SA 510 at ¶ 10. 
 19. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 36(1). 
 20. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (S. Afr.). 
 21. Id. § 5(1). 
 22. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 8(2). 
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II. “Self-Determination” of Religious Institutions in Germany 
On September 23, 2010, the ECHR handed down judgments in two distinct cases based on 
similar facts, but which came to opposite conclusions. The Applicants in both cases were 
employees of church institutions and were dismissed, again in both instances, because they 
were involved in extra-marital relations.23 The complaint against their dismissal was 
essentially based on Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, which protect the right of everyone “to respect for his private 
and family life, his home and his correspondence.”24 The facts in these two cases are 
summarized in the presentation of Professor Scharffs. 
Obst and Schüth Revisited  
It appears from Professor Scharffs’ summary that the dismissal of Michael Heinz Obst, 
Director for Europe in the Department of Public Relations of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints (the Mormon Church), was upheld by the ECHR on the basis that the labor 
courts of Germany, in reviewing the legality of his dismissal, adequately considered the 
impact of the discharge on the Applicant’s personal and family life.25 The ECHR noted that 
the effect on the personal and family life of the Applicant would be minimal, given the fact 
that Mr. Obst was still relatively young and should be able to find alternative employment 
without too much hassle.26 The ECHR also noted that Mr. Obst, upon accepting the position 
of Director for Europe, was, or should have been, aware of the special premium placed by the 
Mormon Church on marital fidelity.27 His dismissal by the Mormon Church could therefore 
not be faulted. 
In the case of Bernhard Josef Schüth, organist and choirmaster of the Catholic 
congregation of St. Lambert in Essen, Germany, the ECHR came to the opposite conclusion. 
The marriage of Mr. Schüth broke down in 1994. He subsequently lived with another woman 
in an extra-marital relationship beginning in 1995. At the time of his dismissal by the 
Church, that other woman was expecting his baby. The ECHR paid special attention to the 
question of whether or not the labor courts of Germany considered the impact of his dismissal 
on his personal and family life and noted that the legal protection afforded to the rights of the 
Applicant by the European Convention was never mentioned in proceedings before the labor 
courts.28 The labor courts consequently failed to strike a balance between the interests of the 
Catholic Church and the rights of the Applicant.29 The signature of Mr. Schüth on his 
contract of employment cannot be interpreted as an indisputable undertaking to lead a life of 
abstinence following the break-up of his marriage or in the event of a divorce.30 The fact that 
                                                                                                                               
 23. Obst, App. No. 425/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010); Schüth, App. No. 1620/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010). 
 24. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 
4, 1950,    213 U.N.T.S 222 [hereinafter European Convention]. 
 25. Obst, App. No. 4205/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 49. 
 26. Id. ¶ 48. 
 27. Id. ¶ 50. 
 28. Schüth, App. No. 1620/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 67. 
 29. Id. ¶ 74. 
 30. Id. ¶ 71. 
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the Applicant would only have limited opportunities to find alternative employment received 
special emphasis in the opinion of the ECHR (at the time, he had a temporary job at a 
Protestant congregation).31 Since the labor court neglected to strike a balance between the 
rights of the Applicant, in respect to his private and family life, and the interests of the 
Church, the ECHR decided that the respect for the private and family life of Mr. Schüth, as 
protected by Article 8 of the European Convention, had been violated. His discharge 
consequently constituted a violation of the European Convention.  
More recently, in Siebenhaar v. Germany, the ECHR reiterated the principles outlined in 
Obst and Schüth.32 In this instance, though, the Applicant’s rights in contention were based 
on the freedom of thought, conscience and religion guaranteed by Article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Astrid Siebenhaar was employed 
by a day-care center of a congregation in Pforzheim of the Evangelical (Lutheran) Church. 
She was discharged by church authorities when they were alerted to the fact that she was a 
member of the Universal Church of Humanism and, in fact, also conducted primary 
education classes within that religious sect. The ECHR, following the reasoning in Obst, 
decided that her dismissal did not amount to a violation of the freedom of religion provisions 
of the European Convention.  
The Doctrine of Positive Obligation 
It must be emphasized that the ECHR does not have jurisdiction over the Mormon 
Church, the Roman Catholic Church or the Lutheran Church. It can only adjudicate 
compliance by High Contracting Parties (Member States of the Council of Europe) with their 
obligations under the European Convention.  
However, the ECHR has developed the “doctrine of positive obligation,” based on Article 1 
of the European Convention, which provides: “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to 
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in . . . this Convention.”33 
In virtue of this provision, High Contracting Parties are not only obligated to refrain from 
human rights violations through state action, they must also put laws and procedures in 
place that will protect the rights and freedoms of their nationals against infringement by non-
state actors.34 In Obst, the ECHR referred to the principle of positive obligation as “the 
adoption of measures aimed at respect for the private life, even in mutual relations between 
                                                                                                                               
 31. Id. ¶ 73. 
 32. Siebenhaar v. Allemagne, App. No. 18136/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=Siebenha
ar%20%7C%2018136/02&sessionid=79867538&skin=hudoc-en. 
 33. European Convention art. 1, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20213/volume-213-I-2889-English.pdf. 
 34. See, e.g., HLR v. France, App. No. 24573/94, 1997 Eur. Ct. H.R. 23 ¶ 40 (1997); A v. The United 
Kingdom, App. No. 25599/94, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 22 (1998). Many years ago, an American court 
also seemed to subscribe to the same idea by proclaiming: “Denying includes inaction as well as 
action . . . the omission to protect, as well as the omission to pass laws for protection.” United States 
v. Hall, 26 F.Cas. 79, 81 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871). However, the principle of state action was the one that 
prevailed in the United States. 
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individuals,”35 and it added that “it is required of the State, as a component of its positive 
obligation under Article 8, to recognize the complainant’s right to respect for his private and 
family life as against measures enforced by the Mormon Church for his dismissal.”36 
Germany complied with its positive obligation by establishing labor courts and by making 
provisions for the review of judgments of those courts by the Federal Constitutional Court 
(das Bundesverfassungsgericht),37 and further by affording the Applicant the opportunity to 
take his case to a labor court in order to contest the legality of his dismissal in view of the 
rights associated with his ecclesiastical duties and by balancing his competing interests up 
against those of the Church.38 In Obst, the ECHR decided that Germany, through its labor 
courts, complied with its positive obligation by taking into account the right of the Applicant 
to his private and family life and violation thereof by the Mormon Church. In Siebenhaar the 
ECHR came to a similar conclusion, holding that the German labor courts adequately 
considered the effect of the Applicant’s dismissal in relation to her freedom of religion.  
 In Schüth, the ECHR came to the opposite conclusion: The labor court did not balance 
the entire scope of the conflicting interests that were at issue: It made no mention of the 
family life of the Applicant,39 and “the interests of the ecclesiastical employer was [sic] not 
weighed up against the right of the Applicant to respect for his private and family life as 
guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention, but [the labor court] only considered his 
interests of remaining in the employ of the Church.”40 Therefore, the protection afforded to 
him did not comply with the positive obligation of Germany as a High Contracting Party to 
the European Convention.  
The question that the ECHR therefore had to decide was not primarily whether or not the 
Mormon or Catholic or Lutheran Churches violated the Convention provisions relating to the 
right of everyone to respect for their private and family life,41 or with a view to freedom of 
religion,42 but whether Germany adequately secured that right and freedom from 
infringement by the churches concerned. Proceedings in the German labor courts, and not the 
discriminatory practices of the concerned churches, were therefore at issue.  
                                                                                                                               
 35. Obst, App. No. 425/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 41 (“l’adoption de mesures visant au respect de la vie 
privée jusque dans les relations des individus entre eux.”); See also Schüth, App. No. 1620/03, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. at ¶  55; Siebenhaar, App. No. 18136/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 38. 
 36. Obst, App. No. 425/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 43 (“l’Etat était tenu, dans le cadre de ses obligations 
positives découlant de l’article 8, de reconnaître au requérant le droit au respect de sa vie privée 
contre la mesure de licenciement prononcée par l’Eglise mormone.”); accord Siebenhaar, App. No. 
18136/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 40; Schüth, App. No. 1620/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 57. 
 37. Siebenhaar, App. No. 18136/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 42; Obst, App. No. 425/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 45; 
Schüth, App. No. 1620/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 59. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Schüth, App. No. 1620/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 67. 
 40. Id. (“Les intérèts de l’Eglise employeur n’ont ainsi pas été mis en balance avec le droit du requérent 
au respect de sa vie privée et familiale, garanti par l’article 8 de la Convention, mais uniquement 
avec son intérȇt d’ȇtre maintenu dans son emploi.”) 
 41. European Convention, supra note 24, art. 8. 
 42. Id. art. 9. 
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The Status of Religious Organizations in Germany 
The status of churches and other religious institutions in Germany is governed by the 
Church Clauses (die Kirchenartikel) in the Weimar Constitution of August 11, 1919.43 These 
were incorporated into the German Constitution by Article 140 of the Grundgesetz für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland of 1949.44 Article 137(3) of the Weimar Constitution provides as 
follows: “Religious societies shall regulate and administer their affairs independently within 
the limits of the law that applies to all. They shall confer their offices without the 
participation of the state or the civil community.”45 
The principle embodied in this provision is commonly referred to as “the right to self-
determination of churches” (das kirchlichen Selbstbestimmungsrechts).46 Its details were 
specified in a judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht of 198547 in an appeal against two 
decisions of the German Federal Labor Court relating to (a) the dismissal of a medical doctor 
in a Catholic hospital in Essen,48 and (b) the dismissal of an accountant at a Catholic youth 
hostel in München.49 The doctor was dismissed because he publicly testified to his personal 
view on abortions (which was in conflict with official church policy on the matter), and the 
accountant because he defected from the Catholic Church. 
 The Bundesverfassungsgericht decided that the provisions of Article 137(3) of the 
Weimar Constitution apply not only to churches and their independent components, but also 
to other institutions, irrespective of their legal construction, which in view of their purpose 
and disposition, are self-evidently, according to perceptions of the church, associated with the 
church in a certain way and which may be required to undertake and to execute a component 
of the church’s calling.50 The constitutional guarantee of the right to self-determination 
remains of vital importance for purposes of specifying these labor relations, and includes the 
competence of churches to require their employees to uphold the prevailing principles of the 
                                                                                                                               
 43. Die Verfassung des Deutschen Rechts [Constitution] Aug. 11, 1919, arts. 137-141 [hereinafter 
WEIMAR CONST.]. 
 44. GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 
1949, BGBL. I, art. 140 (Ger.) (incorporating the provisions of art. 136-40 into the Grundgesetz). 
 45. WEINMAR CONST. art. 137(3) (July 31, 1919) (Ger.) (“Jede Religionsgesellschaft ordnet und verwaltet 
ihre Angelegenheiten selbständig innerhalb der Schranken des für alle geltenden Gesetzes. Sie 
verleiht ihre Ämter ohne Mittwirkung des Staates oder der bürgerlichen Gemeinschaft.”). 
 46. Selbstbestimmungsrecht, as exemplified by the Weimar Constitution, must not be confused with the 
right to self-determination of contemporary international law. The right to self-determination of 
contemporary international law does include the right of members of religious communities to 
practice their religion, and to form, join, and maintain religious association. See S. AFR. CONST., 
1996 §31(1) (a) and (b). It does not include the right of religious institutions to regulate and 
administer their own internal affairs. This is a matter of sphere sovereignty. 
 47. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 70, 138, Loyalitätspflicht (June 4, 1985) 
(Ger.). 
 48. 2 AZR 591/80 (October 21, 1982); 2 AZR 628/80 (October 21, 1982). 
 49. 7 AZR 249/81 (Mar. 23, 1984). 
 50. BVerfGE, supra note 47, at 162, ¶ B.II. 1a. (“Diese Selbstordnungs- und Selbstverwaltungsgarantie 
kommt nicht nur den verfaßten Kirchen und deren rechtlich selbständigen Teilen zugute, sondern 
allen der Kirche in bestimmter Weise zugeordneten Einrichtungen ohne Rücksicht auf ihre 
Rechtsform, wenn sie nach kirchlichem Selbstverständnis ihrem Zweck oder ihrer Aufgabe 
entsprechend berufen sind, ein Stück des Auftrags der Kirche wahrzunemen und zu erfüllen”). 
10  SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  147 (2012) 
156 
religious and ethical doctrines of the church.51 Employees of churches are accordingly bound 
to uphold “loyalty commitments” (Loyalitätsobliegenheiten) toward the church and the 
principles for which it stands.52 
Churches, like all other persons, must execute their freedom of contract subject to the 
labor laws of the state.53 This does not mean, however, that the labor law of the state will 
necessarily in all instances trump the right to self-determination of a church.54 It is therefore 
necessary to strike a balance between the conflicting interests inherent in obligatory labor 
practices and the demands of ecclesiastical autonomy, and in this process, a special premium 
is to be placed on the personal image of churches (Selbstverständnis der Kirchen).55  
After all, it remains constitutional to leave it up to the Church itself to take binding 
decisions as to what “the credibility of the Church and the advocacy thereof” requires, what 
constitutes “specific ecclesiastical matters,” what the “closeness” of such matters entails, what 
is included in the “essential principles of faith-related and ethical doctrine,” and what should 
be regarded as — at times, serious — violations of these doctrines.56  
The judgments of the ECHR in Obst, Schüth and Siebenhaar added a particular 
dimension to the principles which Germany is required to demand of its labor courts: the 
effects of dismissal of an employee, for whatever reason, on the personal and family life, or on 
religious freedom, of the employee. This particular constraint on the constitutional right of 
church institutions to require loyalty of its workers, with regard to the principles and 
practices upheld by the church as part of its confession of faith, seems to place a special 
burden on the “right to self-determination” of religious institutions. It might happen that 
church institutions are constrained, in view of human rights standards deriving from the 
European Convention, to put up with the services of someone who commits marital infidelity 
(Obst and Schüth), who turns out to be an active member of a sect whose beliefs and practices 
are at odds with those of the employer church (Siebenhaar), who publicly contradicts 
established dogma of the Church (2 AZR 591/80 and 2 AZR 628/80), or who terminates his or 
her membership of the Church (7 AZR 249/81). On the other hand, though, labor courts are 
only required to take account of the effect of the dismissal of an employee on his or her 
personal and family life, or on his or her freedom of religion, and to ask themselves whether 
the consequences of the employee’s conduct, with regard to the calling of the church, was 
really of such a nature as to justify the negative effects his or her dismissal would have on his 
                                                                                                                               
 51. Id. at 165, ¶ B.II. 1a. (“Die Verfassungsgarantie des Selbstbestimmungsrechts bleibt für die 
Gestaltung dieser Arbeitsverhältnisse wesenlich . . . Dazu gehört weiter die Befugnis der Kirche, 
den ihr angehörenden Arbeitsnehmern die Beachtung jedenfalls der tragenden Grundsätze der 
kirchlichen Glaubens–und Sittenlehre aufzuerlegen. . . .”). 
 52. See e.g., id. ¶ A.pr and A.2. 
 53. Id. ¶ B.II. 1e. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. (“Dabei ist dem Selbstverstӓndnis der Kirchen ein besonderes Gewicht beizumessen.”) 
 56. BVerfGE, supra note 47, at ¶ B.2a: “Es bleibt danach grundsӓtzlich den verfaßten Kirchen 
überlassen, verbindlich zu bestimmen, was ‘die Glaubwürdigkeit der Kirche und ihrer 
Verkündigung erfordert’, was ‘spezifisch kirchliche Aufgaben’ sind, was ‘Nӓhe’ zu ihnen bedeutet, 
welches die ‘wesentlichen Grundsӓtze der Glaubens- und Sittenlehre’ sind und was als — 
gegebenenfalls schwerer — Verstoß gegen diese anzusehen ist.” 
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or her personal and family life or religious freedom. It might turn out that the game was not 
worth the candle after all. 
The South African Model 
The current South African Constitution can generally be described, as far as religion and 
religious diversity are concerned, as one of profound toleration and accommodation. It, in 
general, allocates to church institutions the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required 
by the nature of the right and the nature of the church as a legal person;57 it guarantees the 
free exercise of religion;58 it sanctions freedom of assembly59 and freedom of association of 
“[e]veryone”60; it guarantees the right to self-determination of religious communities,61 and 
makes provision for a Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, 
Religious and Linguistic Communities;62 it envisions the establishment, by means of national 
legislation, of a Pan South African Language Board charged, inter alia, with promoting and 
ensuring respect for “Arabic, Hebrew, Sanskrit and other languages used for religious 
purposes in South Africa.”63  
The Constitutional Court, on several occasions, emphasized the vital importance for the 
state of religion as a component of South Africa’s constitutional democracy. In a case 
instructing the legislature to amend a provision in the Marriage Act that was based on the 
common-law definition of a marriage as “a union of one man with one woman, to the 
exclusion, while it lasts, of all others,”64 in order to make allowance for same-sex marriages, 
the Constitutional Court was confronted with amici briefs claiming, with reference to texts 
from the Old and New Testaments, that from a religious perspective, “the institution of 
marriage simply cannot sustain the intrusion of same-sex unions.”65 Justice Albie Sachs, 
delivering the unanimous decision of the Court, noted the many difficulties attending “the 
relationship foreshadowed by the Constitution between the sacred and the secular.”66 He 
went on to say:  
Religious bodies play a large and important part in public life, through schools, hospitals and 
poverty relief programmes. They command ethical behaviour from their members and bear 
witness to the exercise of power by State and private agencies; they promote music, art and 
theatre; they provide halls for community activities, and conduct a great variety of social 
activities for their members and the general public. They are part of the fabric of public life, 
and constitute active elements of the diverse and pluralistic nation contemplated by the 
Constitution. Religion is not just a question of belief or doctrine. It is part of the people’s 
temper and culture, and for many believers a significant part of their way of life. Religious 
                                                                                                                               
 57. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 8(4). 
 58. Id. § 15(1). 
 59. Id. § 17. 
 60. Id. § 18. 
 61. Id. § 31. 
 62. Id. §§ 181(1)(c), 185-86. See Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, 
Religious and Linguistic Communities Act 19 of 2002 (S. Afr.). 
 63. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 6(5)(b)(ii). 
 64. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie and Others; Lesbian and Gay Equal. Project and Others v. 
Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC) at ¶ 3 (S. Afr.). 
 65. Lesbian and Gay Equal. Project (3) BCLR at ¶ 88. 
 66.    Id. ¶ 89. 
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organizations constitute important sectors of national life and accordingly have a right to 
express themselves to government and the courts on the great issues of the day. They are 
active participants in public affairs fully entitled to have their say with regard to the way law 
is made and applied.67
  
Equality Concerns 
As noted earlier, equal protection and non-discrimination constitute the most basic norm 
of the South African constitutional dispensation, and unfair discriminatory practices based 
on, amongst other things, gender and sexual orientation are presumed to be unfair. The 
prohibition of such discriminatory practices by the state, as well as by private individuals and 
group entities (legal persons other than the state), is included in the constitutional 
proscription of discrimination. Drafters of the 1996 Constitution instructed the legislature to 
enact a law to afford substance to the prohibition of unfair discrimination by non-state 
perpetrators. The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Acts was 
enacted in 2000 to give effect to this instruction. 
Imposing the constitutional proscription of unfair discrimination on, for example, religious 
institutions, was, in a sense, unfortunate. Many mainline churches still uphold age-old 
practices that amount to gender discrimination against women, and does one really want to 
entrust the state with the power and obligation to compel the Roman Catholic Church, the 
Greek Orthodox Church, Jewish religious institutions, and the Gereformeerde Kerk (related to 
a Church in the Netherlands with the same name and the Christian Reformed Church in the 
United States) to ordain women as part of their clergy? Surely, that would amount to political 
totalitarianism, which “becomes evident when State authority extends into the private 
enclave of non-State societal circles, such as family life, academic institutions and the 
sovereign sphere of the churches.”68 Nor has the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act brought comfort in this regard. 
The Act singled out unfair discrimination based on race, gender, and disability for special 
scrutiny, but applies broadly to discrimination by the state and by non-state perpetrators. It 
thus deviated from the constitutional legislative intent in at least three respects: 
First, it should be clear to everyone that the drafters’ instruction only applied to unfair 
discrimination by non-state perpetrators,69 yet the legislature included unfair discrimination 
by the state in its provisions.70 
Second, drafters of the Constitution were sensitive to the fact that discrimination in the 
private sphere should be made subject to less, or other, limitations than those applying to 
discrimination by the state, but the legislature saw fit not to make that distinction.71 
                                                                                                                               
 67. Id. ¶ 90. 
 68. Johan D. van der Vyver, The Function of Legislation as an Instrument of Social Reform, 93 S. AFR. 
L.J. 56, 66 (1976); see also Johan D. Van der Vyver, Gelykberegtiging, 61 J. CONTEMP. ROMAN-
DUTCH LAW 367, 395 (1998). 
 69. The instruction to enact legislation (“[n]ational legislation must be enacted”) is part of  S. AFR. 
CONST., 1996 § 9(4), which deals exclusively with unfair discrimination in the private sphere 
(emphasis added). 
 70. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 § 6 (“Neither the State 
nor any person may unfairly discriminate against any person.”) (S. Afr.). 
 71. Id. 
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Third, the proscription of unfair discrimination by the state and in the private sphere based 
on race, gender and disability was singled out by the legislature for special scrutiny and was 
subjected to limitations that do not apply to unfair discrimination on any of the other 
grounds specified in the Constitution.72 
In terms of the Act, discrimination based on gender includes “any . . . religious practice, 
which impairs the dignity of women and undermines equality between women and men.”73 
This provision clearly implicates the exclusion of women from ecclesiastical offices. Since 
gender is included in the list of grounds that prima facie renders differentiations for legal 
purposes to be a matter of unfair discrimination,74 the burden of proof would be on a church 
institution to show that exclusion of women from ecclesiastical offices is in fact not “unfair.”75 
The Act contains a long list of circumstances that may be considered in this regard, for 
example, “whether the discrimination reasonably and justifiably differentiates between 
persons according to objectively determinable criteria, intrinsic to the activity concerned,”76 
“the impact or likely impact of the discrimination on the complainant,”77 and “whether the 
discrimination has a legitimate purpose.”78 It does not seem as though these considerations 
would contribute to alleviate the burden of proof resting on a church institution in any way; 
and as this writer observed before, “The mere fact that a church may be compelled to justify 
its internal legal provisions before a secular tribunal, amounts to totalitarianism of the worst 
kind.”79 
Sphere Sovereignty of Religious Institutions  
In spite of the Act, South African authorities have remained particularly sensitive to the 
internal sphere sovereignty of religious institutions. 
Discrimination based on sexual orientation by a church institution was at issue in the case 
of Strydom v. Dutch Reformed Congregation, Moreleta Park, decided by the Equality Court, 
Transvaal Provincial Division on August 27, 2006.80 Johan Daniel Strydom was employed by 
the Moreleta Park congregation as a music instructor (organ teacher) in its Arts Academy. He 
was fired by the Church authorities because he became involved in a same-sex relationship 
with another man. Mr. Strydom challenged his dismissal before the Equality Court and was 
awarded compensation in the amount of R.75 OOO for pain and suffering and a further R.11 
OOO for loss of income. The Reverent Dirkie van der Spuy of the Moreleta Park congregation 
testified that elders and deacons of the Church may be gay but are not allowed to practice 
homosexuality. The dismissal of Mr. Strydom, according to the Equality Court, amounted to 
                                                                                                                               
 72. Id. §§ 7-9. 
 73. Id. § 8. 
 74. Id. § 1(xxii). 
 75. Id. § 13(2)(b)(ii). 
 76. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 § 14(2)(c). 
 77. Id. § 14(3)(b). 
 78. Id. § 14(3)(f). 
 79. Johan D. Van der Vyver, Constitutional Perspective of Church-State Relations in South Africa, 1999 
BYU L. REV. 635, 664-67 (1999); see also Gelykberegtiging, supra note 68, at 397 (own translation 
from the original Afrikaans). 
 80. Strydom v. Nederduitse Gereformeerde Gemeente, Moreletta Park 2009 (4) SA 510 (Equality Court, 
TPA) (S. Afr.). 
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unbecoming discrimination under the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act. The Church did not take the matter on appeal. 
The Equality Court based its decision mainly on the fact that Mr. Strydom (a) served as an 
independent contractor, (b) was in no way involved in the spiritual activities of the Church, 
and (c) was not even a member of the particular Dutch Reformed Church, which brought suit 
in the matter.81 The Equality Court made it abundantly clear that it would not have ruled 
against the Church if Mr. Strydom’s contractual obligations included functions that were part 
of the spiritual mission of the Church. It referred in this regard to the exposition by a leading 
analyst of the religion clauses in the South African Constitution, Paul Farlam, of instances 
where the state ought not to interfere in the internal affairs of religious institutions, and cited 
(with approval) the following passage from the Farlam article: 
The first scenario involves discrimination against a person with spiritual responsibilities 
(such as a priest or a candidate for ordination). Few exercises are more central to religious 
freedom than the right of a church to choose its own spiritual leaders. If a court were to hold 
that churches could not deem sexual orientation, or any of the other enumerated ground[s] 
[sic] in the equality clause, a disqualifying factor for the priesthood, the effect on many 
churches could be devastating. Consequently, although the value of equality is foundational 
to the new constitutional dispensation, it is unlikely that equality considerations could 
outweigh the enormous impact of failing to give churches an exemption in relation to their 
spiritual leaders. Where the appointment, dismissal and employment conditions of religious 
leaders (such as priests, imams, rabbis, and so forth) are concerned, religious bodies are 
likely to be exempted from compliance with legislation prohibiting unfair discrimination.82  
The substance of this citation — although it was included in the judgment merely as an 
obiter dictum — must be commended. It reflects the spirit thus far maintained in practices 
and court judgments dealing with domestic affairs of religious institutions. 
For example, public benefit activities that are exempt from income tax include “the 
promotion or practice of religion which encompasses acts of worship, witness, teaching and 
community service based on a belief in a deity,” as well as “the promotion and/or practice of a 
belief,” and “the promotion of, or engaging in, philosophical activities.”83 There are many 
racially-exclusive churches in South Africa,84 but, to the best of my knowledge, none of those 
have been denied tax exemptions. 
The law that was enacted in 2006 to afford legal sanction to same-sex marriages (referred 
to in the Act as “civil unions”) contains a provision that affords the right to a marriage officer 
                                                                                                                               
 81. The Churches denoted in English as Dutch Reformed actually comprise three quite distinct 
denominations (two distinct words in the Afrikaans language that are used to distinguish the three 
churches — “Gereformeerd” and “Hervormd” — can only be translated in English as “Reformed”).  
The Plaintiff in this case was a congregation of the “Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk” and Mr. 
Strydom was a member of the “Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk”. 
 82. Strydom, 2009 (4) SA, supra note 80, ¶ 15, with reference to Paul Farlam, Freedom of Religion, 
Belief and Opinion, in 3 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA vol. 3 Ch. 41, 47 (Stuart Woolman 
et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2009). 
 83. Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, Ninth Schedule, Pt. I, ¶ 5. 
 84. Leaving aside adherents to traditional African religions and the many independent Christian 
churches in the African community (of which there are about 7,000 in South Africa), mention can be 
made of the Afrikaanse Protestantse Kerk (Afrikaans Protestant Church) which expressly reserves 
membership of the Church to whites only. 
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to inform the Minister of Home Affairs that “he or she objects on grounds of conscience, 
religion and belief to solemnizing a civil union between persons of the same sex, whereupon 
the marriage officer cannot be compelled to solemnise such civil unions.”85 
In South Africa, courts of law will not “embark upon an evaluation of the acceptability, 
logic, consistency or comprehensibility of . . . [religious] belief.”86 However, should a conflict 
arise as to the legal rights and duties of parties to a dispute, a court will not decline to give a 
judgment in a matter, by reason of doctrinal issues, that might have a bearing on those rights 
and duties.87 South African courts have thus entertained jurisdiction, following a schism, to 
decide which one of two religious factions was entitled to the use of a particular name,88 or 
could lay claim to church property;89 and they have taken decisions of an internal 
ecclesiastical tribunal on review.90 
Religious institutions are particularly sensitive to the exercise of review powers by secular 
courts in regard to disciplinary proceedings of an ecclesiastical tribunal.91 In South Africa, 
decisions of an ecclesiastical tribunal cannot be taken on appeal to a secular court, but such 
decisions are subject to review by a court of law.92 The court exercising review powers will not 
interfere in the domestic affairs of the ecclesiastical institution duly constituted and operating 
in terms of its own rules, but will intervene if an ecclesiastical tribunal has failed to follow the 
internally prescribed procedural rules or acted ultra vires.93 The tribunal must apply its mind 
to the matter and not take arbitrary decisions; it must remain within the confines of its 
authority and not act ultra vires; it must maintain good faith and not be motivated by malice, 
ill will or spite, and it must act reasonably.94  
                                                                                                                               
 85. Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 § 6 (S. Afr.). 
 86. Christian Education SA v. Minister of Education of the Government of the RSA 1999 (9) BCLR 951 
(SE) at 958 (S. Afr.), aff’d, Christian Education v. Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC) (S. 
Afr.). 
 87. Allen & others N.N.O. v. Gibbs & others 1977 (3) SA 212 (SEC) 218 (S. Afr.). 
 88. Old Apostolic Church of Africa v. Non-White Old Apostolic Church of Africa 1975 (2) SA 684 (C) (S. 
Afr.). 
 89. The Nederduitsche Hervormde Church v. The Nederduitsche Hervormde of Gereformeerde Church 
1893 (10) Cape L.J. 327 (S. Afr.). 
 90. Jamile v. African Congregational Church 1971 (3) SA 836 (D) (S. Afr.); Theron v. Ring van 
Wellington van die NG Kerk in SA 1976 (2) SA 1 (A) (S. Afr.); Taylor v. Kurtstag NO & others 2005 
(1) SA 362 (W) (S. Afr.). 
 91. See Michael J. Broyd, Forming Religious Communities and Respecting Dissenter's Rights: A Jewish 
Tradition for a Modern Society, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: RELIGIOUS 
PERSPECTIVES 203, 224 (John Witte Jr. & Johan D. van der Vyver eds., 1996) (noting that “the 
question of membership in the colony of the Church should be beyond review of a secular court”), 
cited with approval in Taylor 2005 (1) SA at ¶ 43. 
 92. Du Plessis v. Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church 1930 CPD 403, 420-21 (S. Afr.); Taylor 2005 (1) 
SA 362 (W) (S. Afr.). 
 93. Odendaal v. Loggerenberg NNO (1) 1961 (1) SA 712 (0) 719 (S. Afr.); Yiba & others v. African Gospel 
Church 1999 (2) SA 949 (CPD) 961 (S. Afr.); see also NGK in Afrika (OVS) v. Verenigde Geref. Kerk 
in Suider-Afrika 1999 (2) SA 156 (SCA) 170 (S. Afr.) (noting that the General Synod must comply 
with the internal rules of church law). 
 94. Johan D. van der Vyver, Religion, in 23 THE LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA ¶ 229 (W.A. Joubert & T.J. 
Scott, eds., 1986). 
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In conducting disciplinary hearings, an ecclesiastical tribunal must uphold the 
“elementary rules of justice.”95 Emphasis is often placed on the right of a person under 
investigation to be heard in his or her own defense (audi alteram partem), but even then, the 
ultimate test is not audi alteram partem as such but “the fairness of the process” in light of 
the nature of the proceedings.96 The audi alteram partem rule in any event does not apply if 
the person wanting to be heard lays claim to a privilege to which he or she will normally not 
be entitled.97 
Upholding the basic principles of justice and other constitutional rights of members of a 
religious institution has become critical in South Africa due to, and to the extent of, applying 
the Bill of Rights obligations to juristic persons. In Taylor v. Kurtstag, the Witwatersrand 
Local Division of the High Court was confronted by exactly that dilemma.98 The Plaintiff in 
the matter had been served a notice of excommunication (cherem) from the Orthodox Jewish 
Faith by a Jewish ecclesiastical court (Beth Din) and applied for the cherem to be set aside on 
the grounds that it violated his constitutional right to freedom of religion (Section 15(1) of the 
Constitution) and, as a component of the right to self-determination, the entitlement to 
practice his religion and maintain religious associations with fellow members of his faith 
(Section 31(1)(b) of the Constitution). That indeed was found to be the case, but the Court 
went on to consider the legality of those violations in view of the limitations provisions of the 
Constitution (Section 36). The Court noted that “[a] religious tribunal is subject to the 
discipline of the Constitution, but its being a religious body giving effect to the associational 
rights of its members, must be accounted for.”99 Having noted that “the reluctance to 
interfere in matters of faith, whether it be procedural or otherwise, cannot be discarded,” and 
in the absence of evidence of bias or bad faith on the part of the Beth Din,100 the Court upheld 
the constitutionality of its cherem. 
In December 2009, the Reverent Ecclesia de Lange, a minister in the Methodist Church of 
Southern Africa in Rondebosch, Cape Town entered into a same-sex union with Amanda van 
Aswegen. The Church, which does not condone same-sex marriage, suspended her in January 
2010 from her post. De Lange is currently fighting to get her job back through internal church 
arbitration channels. The hearing was conducted behind closed doors in January, 2011. A 
disciplinary committee recommended that De Lange “continue under suspension until such 
time as the Methodist Church of Southern Africa makes a binding decision on ministers in 
same-sex unions.” In a statement on Facebook and other websites, De Lange proclaimed:  
I desire to serve Jesus. I desire to be true to myself. I desire to minister within the Methodist 
Church of Southern Africa with integrity and be faithful to God’s call on my life.  
                                                                                                                               
 95. Theron v. Ring van Wellington van die NG Kerk 1976 (2) SA 1 (A) 10 (S. Afr.); Odendaal 1961 (1) SA 
712 (0) 719 (S. Afr.). 
 96. Taylor 2005 (1) SA 362 (W) ¶ 87 (S. Afr.). 
 97. Mankatshu v. Old Apostolic Church of Africa & others 1994 (2) SA 458 (Tk AD) 463-64 (S. Afr.). See 
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I have reached the point where I can no longer be silent. I have come to see that it is better to 
be rejected for who I am than to be accepted for who I am not.101 
The matter is currently pending. It is submitted that if the Church were to terminate the 
Reverent De Lange’s appointment as a minister, provided the proper procedures are applied 
by the Church, a court of law will not overrule that decision. 
Self-determination of Religious Communities 
While sphere sovereignty applies to the exercise of internal powers by, for example, a 
religious institution (an institutional group right), the right to self-determination of a 
religious community vests in individual members of the community (a collective group 
right).102 It must be emphasized at the outset that the South African community is made up 
of extremely diverse and highly polarized population groups. There is a general tendency in 
the world today to promote homogeneity within the body politic. The Constitution of Nigeria, 
for example, placed an obligation on the State to encourage inter-marriage between members 
of different religious, ethnic, or linguistic communities for the purpose of “promoting national 
integration.”103 South Africa, by contrast, encourages pride in one’s ethnic, linguistic, and 
religiously defined group identities. The constitutional preamble thus expresses the belief 
that all who live in South Africa are “united in our diversity.”104 It seeks to create, in the 
celebrated words of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, “[a] rainbow people.”105 The Constitution 
accordingly guarantees the right to self-determination of cultural, religious, and linguistic 
communities in accordance with international directives that apply in this regard.106 In terms 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, self-determination entails the 
following principle: “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the 
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own 
religion, or to use their own language.”107 
The Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities similarly speaks of “the right [of national or ethnic, religious and 
linguistic minorities] to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, 
and to use their own language, in private and in public, freely and without interference or any 
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The South African Constitution captured the gist of these 
provisions by affording to cultural, religious and linguistic communities the entitlement “to 
enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language,”109 and “to form, join and 
maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society.”110 
Implementation of these provisions can be illustrated with reference to the case of Sunali 
Pillay.111 Ms. Pillay was a teenage South African girl of Hindu extraction. She had gained 
entry into the Durban Girls’ High School — one of the most prestigious state schools in South 
Africa — where she received excellent education. When she reached a certain stage of 
maturity, a golden stud was inserted in her nose, which is a custom in the Hindu community 
indicating that a girl has become eligible for marriage.112 This brought her into conflict with 
the school authorities. The school’s code of conduct, signed by her parents as a condition for 
Sunali’s admission to Girls’ High, prohibited the wearing of any jewelry, except earrings, and 
then only under meticulous conditions specified in the code of conduct.113 Sunali’s mother 
explained to the school authorities that her daughter did not wear the nose stud as a token of 
fashion but in deference to an age-old tradition of the Hindu community. The school 
management refused to grant Sunali an exemption from its dress code. A complaint was 
thereupon filed by Mrs. Pillay in the Equality Court, based on discrimination.114 The 
Equality Court ruled in favor of the school,115 but the Natal Provincial Division of the High 
Court set aside the decision of the Equality Court on appeal.116 The matter eventually came 
before the Constitutional Court of South Africa. The Constitutional Court decided that refusal 
by the school authorities to grant Sunali an exemption from the jewelry provision in the 
school’s code of conduct amounted to unreasonable discrimination and was therefore 
unlawful.117 
A case of similar dimensions came before the ECHR. Leyla Şahin was a Muslim student at 
Istanbul University in Turkey. She was excluded from classes because she wore a head scarf. 
A Turkish law banned the wearing of headscarves in all universities and official government 
buildings, basing the proscription on the fact that Turkey is a secular state. In 1998, Şahin 
filed a complaint under the European system for the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.118 The Grand Chamber of the ECHR — the court of final instance in 
the European system of human rights protection — gave judgment in favor of Turkey. It 
decided that the headscarf ban is based on the constitutional principles of secularism and 
equality and consequently did not constitute a violation of the European Convention, nor did 
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her suspension from the University for refusing to remove the head scarf amount to a 
violation of the Convention.119 Ms. Şahin subsequently left Turkey and is now living in 
Vienna.  
The judgment of the South African Constitutional Court was based on the non-
discrimination provisions in the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act of 2000,120 and was more precisely based on the proscription in the Act of 
discrimination based on religion and on culture.121 Basing its decision on the proscription of 
discrimination was perhaps dictated by the fact that the case came to the Constitutional 
Court via the Equality Court, and therefore under the Promotion of Equality and Prevention 
of Unfair Discrimination Act. Had the matter been raised along a different route, the Court 
might have been constrained to deal with it under the religion prong of the right of everyone 
to “freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.”122 It is somewhat surprising 
that the Court, while noting that prohibiting Sunali to wear a nose stud “affects other 
constitutional rights as well” (besides human dignity), mentioned freedom of expression only, 
and not freedom of religion.123
 
This omission was perhaps prompted by the Court’s declining 
to decide definitively whether the wearing of a nose stud by Hindu women was a matter of 
religion or one of culture. The matter also fell squarely within the confines of the right to self-
determination of cultural, religious, and linguistic communities, which, under the South 
African Constitution, includes the entitlement of such communities “to enjoy their culture, 
practice their religion and use their language.”124 
Limitations of the Right to Self-Determination 
The right to self-determination is not absolute but must be exercised in a manner that is 
consistent with the principles enunciated in the Bill of Rights.125 Criminal conduct embarked 
upon in the name of religion cannot be legitimized under the rubric of self-determination. 
South African legislation accordingly prohibits female genital mutilation,126 which in some 
jurisdictions is sought to be legitimized on religious grounds.  
In Prince v. President, Cape Law Society & Others, the Constitutional Court was called 
upon to decide on the constitutionality of a law prohibiting the possession and use of the 
dependence-producing drug cannabis (better known in South Africa as “dagga” and similar to 
marijuana), in so far as that legislation was made applicable to its possession and use for 
religious purposes.127 The applicant in the case was a law graduate whose application for 
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registration of his contract of community service, as a prelude for admission to the practice of 
attorney, had been refused by the Cape Law Society. The Law Society judged that he was not 
“a fit and proper person” for legal practice because of two previous convictions for the illegal 
possession of cannabis, and his stated resolve to continue using the drug. The applicant 
maintained that he was a member of a certain sect, the Rastafari religion, that cannabis was 
regarded by that sect as a “Holy Herb,” and that its use constituted an integral part of 
Rastafari rituals. The Constitutional Court acknowledged that “the right to freedom of 
religion and to practise religion are important rights in an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom, and that the disputed legislation places a 
substantial limitation on the religious practices of Rastafari.”128 However, if an exemption 
were to be made in regard to the possession and use of a harmful drug by persons who do so 
for religious purposes, “the State’s ability to enforce its drug legislation would be 
substantially impaired.”129 In a five to four decision, the Court declined to make an exception 
in favor of persons possessing or using cannabis for religious purposes.  
In Christian Education SA v. Minister of Education of the Government of the RSA, the 
constitutionality of a provision in the South African Schools Act, which prohibits corporal 
punishment in independent schools,130 was at issue.131 The Applicant claimed the right to 
apply corporal punishment in its parochial (independent) schools on Biblical grounds, and 
argued that the legislation being contested violated the right to self-determination afforded to 
religious communities by the Constitution.132 The Court would have nothing of it: the Biblical 
texts cited by the Applicant133 refer to corporal punishment inflicted by parents on their own 
children and do not sanction an entitlement of persons in loco parentis to do the same; 
flogging of children has been designated in South Africa,134 and elsewhere,135 as a cruel and 
inhuman (or degrading) punishment, and, in terms of the Constitution, the right to self-
determination may not be exercised “in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill 
of Rights.”136
 
Speaking for a unanimous court, Sachs, J. observed:  
The underlying problem in any open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom in which conscientious and religious freedom has to be regarded with 
appropriate seriousness, is how far such democracy can and must go in allowing members of 
religious communities to define for themselves which laws they will obey and which not. 
Such a society can cohere only if all its participants accept that certain basic norms and 
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standards are binding. Accordingly, believers cannot claim an automatic right to be 
exempted by their beliefs from the laws of the land. At the same time, the State should, 
wherever reasonably possible, seek to avoid putting believers to extremely painful and 




Faith healing has also come under the spotlight in South Africa. In the U.S., the right of 
parents to withhold life-sustaining medication or therapeutic treatment from a child in their 
care has had a checkered history.138 There are, on the one hand, state laws in place that 
exempt parents who prefer spiritual treatment or faith healing from statutory requirements 
to furnish health care to a child in their care,139 but this concession to freedom of religion will 
not absolve a parent from criminal liability for involuntary manslaughter if the child should 
die in consequence of being denied conventional medical treatment.140 Parents will therefore 
be prosecuted for providing spiritual treatment for their children in lieu of traditional medical 
care, but only if such treatment turned out to be ineffective and resulted in the death of the 
child.141 In South Africa, on the other hand, the High Court, as upper guardian of all 
children, can intervene by sanctioning a feasible medical procedure while the life of the child 
can still be saved.142 In South Africa, the constitutionally protected right to life of the child 
will, in all circumstances, trump the claim to the exercise of religious liberty of the parent. 
III. Concluding Observations 
South African law has been quite meticulous in upholding the sphere sovereignty of non-
state, including religious, institutions. This can perhaps be attributed to the influence of 
Calvinism, or perhaps sensitivity to the dangers of totalitarianism in the form of state 
interference in the internal affairs of non-state institutions.143 It thereby set a commendable 
example in recognizing the competence of religious institutions to uphold spiritual values of 
their own choice or convictions within the internal enclave of their domestic household. 
 The special appeal of sphere sovereignty has over time spread its influence well beyond 
persons and communities dedicated to Calvinistic political thought. There is, for example, 
seemingly a shift in Roman Catholic social theory transforming the typical scholastic doctrine 
of subsidiarity toward recognizing a greater measure of sovereignty of Church and State. 
Professor Ronald Minnerath, special Vatican representative in the University of Strasbourg, 
almost said it in so many words. According to him, Church-State relationships ought to be 
based on (a) the autonomy of each of the two parties, and (b) co-operation in areas of common 
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interest; and he went on to explain: “Recognition of the autonomy of church and state 
requires that each shall be sovereign and independent in its own sphere.”144 
In recent times, several American scholars have ventured to introduce the Calvinistic 
doctrine of sphere sovereignty into American legal thinking. This includes the commendable 
work of Paul Horwitz of the University of Alabama in Tuscaloosa and an analyst of First 
Amendment jurisprudence. Professor Horwitz sought guidance from the Neo-Calvinistic 
doctrine of sphere sovereignty as enunciated by the Dutch political philosopher, Abraham 
Kuyper (1837-1920), to overcome some of the difficulties attending establishment 
jurisprudence in the United States. To this end, he looked beyond the legal norms that may or 
may not be enacted by Congress under the constraints imposed by the Constitution to 
uncover the role of institutions functioning within the protected enclave of the First 
Amendment, such as universities, the press, and religious associations.145 Horwitz 
convincingly argued that such “First Amendment institutions” should be afforded the right to 
operate on a largely self-regulating basis and beyond the supervision of external legal 
regimes.146  
Sensitivity in the United States to the sphere sovereignty of religious institutions is 
exemplified by Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,147 which exempts religious 
corporations, associations, educational institutions, and societies from the Equal Employment 
Opportunity provisions of the Act with respect to the employment of persons of a particular 
religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by the corporation, association, 
educational institution or society of its activities.148 The constitutionality of Section 702 was 
upheld in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Latter Day Saints v. Amos.149 
The Court decided that Section 702 was intended to alleviate significant governmental 
interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious 
mission.150 In that case, a building engineer, working for a nonprofit gymnasium operated by 
religious institutions affiliated with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, was 
dismissed because he had lapsed from the Mormon Faith. The Court upheld the legitimate 
competence of the church authorities to do so. In a concurring judgment, Justice Brennan 
endorsed the internal sovereignty of the Church by saying: 
Determining that certain activities are in furtherance of an organization's religious mission, 
and that only those committed to that mission should conduct them is . . . a means by which 
a religious community defines itself. Solicitude for a church’s ability to do so reflects the idea 
                                                                                                                               
 144. Ronald Minnerath, The Doctrine of the Catholic Church, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD WORLD 
CONFERENCE ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 49, 51 (I.R.L.A. 1989). 
 145. Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and Hard 
Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497 (2007); Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: 
Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2009). 
146.  See Lael Daniel Weinberger, The Business Judgment Rule and Sphere Sovereignty, 27 T.M. COOLEY 
L. REV. 279 (2010). 
 147. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2011). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Latter Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 
(1987). 
 150. Id. at 335. 
 Equality and Sovereignty of Religious Institutions 
169 
that furtherance of the autonomy of religious organizations often furthers religious freedom 
as well.151 
In Kedroff v. St Nicholas Cathedral, Justice Reed, speaking for the majority, referred to “a 
spirit of freedom for religious organizations” that embraces “power to decide for themselves, 
free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and 
doctrine,” which freedom includes the right to select the clergy of the Church.152 
It would perhaps be wise not to lay too much stress on the historical foundation or 
religiously-inspired impetus of principles of good governance, lest this might promote 
negative responses from persons who do not entertain historical and dogmatic loyalties to the 
sources of their origin. The doctrine proclaiming the internal sphere sovereignty of Church 
and State, and international directives calling for protection of the right to self-determination 
of religious communities, should gain support because of their inherent soundness as a 
mechanism for addressing structural varieties and group alliances within human society. 
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